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We study a number of large international military conflicts since
World War II where we establish a news analysis as a proxy for the
estimated likelihood that the conflict will result in a war. We find
that in cases when there is a pre-war phase, an increase in the war
likelihood tends to decrease stock prices, but the ultimate outbreak
of a war increases them. In cases when a war starts as a surprise, the
outbreak of a war decreases stock prices. We show that this paradox
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1 Introduction
“Buy on the sound of the cannon, sell on the sound of the trumpet.” is an
old proverb from the Napoleonic wars, attributed to London financier Nathan
Rothschild. It suggests that the start of a war is a good time to buy stocks
and that stocks should be sold once the war is over. The rationale behind
this advice is that investors tend to overreact to the bad news of a coming
war, leading to underpricing, and that they similarly overreact to the good
news of the end of a war, leading to overpricing.
Economists have been concerned with the causes and consequences of inter-
national military crises for more than one hundred years, one of the first
contributions being the work of Keynes ([1919] 1971). Further work focused
on the interplay between economy and war (Holsti & North 1966, Russett
& Hanson 1975, Collier & Hoeffler 1998) and the impact of war on financial
markets throughout the history (Frey & Kucher 2000).
Recently, this financial market reaction induced by international conflicts has
caught substantial interest in finance. News analysis has been used to reflect
the perceived risk and consequences of the wars. In an early pioneering study,
using content analysis of news, Holsti & North (1966) demonstrate that se-
curity prices are related to rising international tensions during the outbreak
of World War I. In a more general framework, Niederhoffer (1971) codes the
headlines on world events on a seven-point good-bad scale to examine the
impacts of news and Cutler, et al. (1989) analyze the stock market reaction
to world news (including wars) from 1926 to 1985. To quantify effects of in-
ternational conflicts on stock prices, Goldstein (1992) has constructed a scale
to code conflictive versus cooperative events that can be used to assess the
impacts of war risk, as has been pointed out by Schneider & Troeger (2006).
There are further studies on the relation between world news and financial
markets, in particular during times of crisis: Elmendorf, et al. (1996) study
the British bond market reactions to news by comparing the weeks with im-
portant news and the weeks without such news. Similarly, Rigobon & Sack
(2005) distinguish the days with war-related news and the days without those
news to measure the impacts of war risk on financial markets.
Whereas all of these studies either consider particular conflicts or impacts
of war risk on financial markets during (at first glance) peaceful times, we
want to focus in this paper on a slightly different aspect, namely wars with a
“prologue”, i.e., wars which follow a period of tension. In this type of wars we
distinguish two phases: in the first phase, where the cannons are still silent,
there is an increasing danger of a war, possibly interrupted by times of hope
for a peaceful resolution. Afterwards, in the second phase, the “sound of the
cannon” starts and war breaks out.
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The surprising finding of our analysis is that often the reaction of the stock
market to the likelihood of a war is different between these two phases:
whereas in the pre-war phase an increased likelihood of war decreases market
returns, the outbreak of the war itself, so to say the increase of the likelihood
from 99% to 100%, increases market returns!
We observe this striking puzzle for a number of larger wars, including the
Iraq War and World War II. In all cases we study the impact on the US
stock market as measured by S&P500 or Dow Jones Industrial Average. To
complement our results, we also analyze all other international crises with
large impact since World War II, in particular wars that started unexpectedly,
such as the Korean War.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses different proxies to
estimate the likelihood of a war. Section 3 analyzes the Iraq War in 2003 using
different likelihood measurements and shows that a puzzle in the development
of stock prices along the evolvement of an international crisis can be observed.
Using further examples of international wars in section 4, it is shown that
this phenomenon does not seem to be restricted to the Iraq War. Section 5
discusses possible explanations for the puzzle. Section 6 concludes.
2 Estimating the likelihood of war
To analyze market reactions on changes in the likelihood of a war, we first
need to find appropriate proxies for this likelihood. We analyze the Iraq War
since for this war several independent estimates for the probability of a war
are available. Using the Iraq War as a benchmark we establish a simple yet
robust proxy using news that we can then readily apply to older wars where
other data would not be available.
The Iraq crisis started to become serious on January 28, 2003 when president
George W. Bush announced a possible attack of Iraq regardless of respective
resolutions by the UN. After the ultimatum proposed to Saddam Hussein
on March 17 to leave Iraq within 48 hours had expired, the first military
intervention by the US started immediately in the early morning of March
20. Later that morning, President George Bush formally announced the
Operation Iraqi Freedom after the military invasion had already begun.
Following Wolfers & Zitzewitz (2009), we use two independent estimates for
the probability that a war would take place in Iraq: First, the “Saddameter”,
being an expert estimate for the likelihood of an invasion into Iraq which
was published on a daily basis by William Saletan on www.slate.com. This
estimate provides us with data from November 2002 to March 18, 2003.
Second, on the online exchange platform www.tradesports.com there existed
3
Saddam Security June Iraq war news
Saddameter ρ = 0.86 ρ = 0.66
N = 56 N = 81
Saddam Security June ρ = 0.64
N = 78
Table 1: Correlations between different proxies for the probability of a war.
All correlations are significant on the 1% level and use the largest available
number of days from the time series discussed in the main text.
a security, called the “Saddam Security”, which was designed to pay a certain
amount if and only if Saddam Hussein, president of Iraq, would still be in
power at a certain date. A war was expected to end his rule on Iraq, so the
Saddam Security prices gave a good probability estimate for the likelihood
of a war before the designated date (also see Amihud & Wohl (2004)). This
security was available with different maturity dates, where only the March
2003 and June 2003 securities had a long enough price series. We use the
June security, since the pattern of the March security is somehow obfuscated
by the fact that even though the probability for a coming war increased, it
was at times not at all clear whether the eventual war would be over before
the end of March.
As another proxy we studied news data from the New York Times. We
counted how many articles with the key words “war” and “Iraq” appeared
in each day’s issue. To show that this variable is closely related to the
above mentioned probability measurements and that it provides the same
qualitative indications about the war likelihood, we regress each of the two
measurements (i.e., the Saddameter and the Saddam Security) on our news
proxy. The results are reported in Table 1. We see that the news variable is
positively correlated with the Saddameter, that is, the expert measurement
on the war likelihood and the number of (mostly negative) news items run in
the same direction. The comovement between the Saddameter and the news
variable between November 2002 to March 2003 is depicted in Figure 1 and
is negatively related to the development of the S&P 500. Similarly, the news
proxy is positive related to the Saddam Security.
3 The Iraq war puzzle
As mentioned earlier, a puzzle can be observed when analyzing data from
stock market values prior to and at the onset of a war. The relation between
4
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Figure 1: Iraq War: S&P 500 and probability of a war (November 2002 to
March 2003).
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stock market values and the probability of an international conflict emerging
into a war is negative as long as the conflict is still evolving. However, it
becomes positive at the actual onset of the war, thus a positive shock in the
stock market can be observed when the war likelihood increases to 100%.
In other words, an increasing war likelihood seems to decrease stock prices,
while the outbreak of the war itself seems to increase stock prices. This is
what we call the “war puzzle”.
To provide empirical evidence for this puzzle, we begin with an analysis of
the Iraq War in 2003. The main reason for this approach is the fact that
for this war we use two alternative measurements of the probability of a
war, namely the Saddameter and the news variable described in section 2.
As previously explained, this has the advantage that we are able to conduct
econometric analyses for both types of probability measures in the same war.
Hence, showing that the news variable is a valid proxy for the war likelihood,
we can then use this variable to analyze periods of war where no alternative
probability measures are available. In this way we study the relation between
the US stock market and the war likelihood.
Analyzing the characteristics of the S&P 500, news, and the Saddameter,
we find that these time-series are non-stationary in levels, but stationary
in first differences (see Table 2 for augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics
for unit roots). Moreover, we find evidence for a cointegrating relationship
between the S&P 500 and each probability measure of order one (see Table
3). This leads us to the choice of an error correction model to appropriately
model the relation between the US stock market and the war likelihood. The
econometric models employed to study the stock market in the pre-war phase
are
∆SP500t−1 = β1∆SP500t−2 + β2∆newst + γ[SP500t−2 − α0 − α1newst−1] + t
∆SP500t−1 = β1∆SP500t−2 + β2∆Saddt−1 + γ[SP500t−2 − α0 − α1Saddt−1] + t
where ∆SP500 measures absolute daily changes in the S&P 500 and the
error correction parameter γ captures the degree to which deviations from
an equilibrium in the previous period (captured by the error term) affect
current values. Hence, γ is expected to be negative if a long run equilibrium
relationship prevails. Note that the functional form of most of the regressions
used in this and the following sections is such that the explanatory variable
is lagged forward relative to the dependent variable. While this may seem
slightly counterintuitive at first sight, the reason is that there exists a certain
delay between the stock market pricing an event and its actual publication
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Intercept Intercept and trend
levels S&P500 -1.516701 -2.566209
news 0.177096 -7.012188***
Saddameter -0.512926 -1.890143
first differences S&P500 -9.688364*** -9.622123***
news -7.768300*** -7.820706***
Saddameter -7.838634*** -7.784029***
Table 2: Iraq War: ADF test statistics for unit roots.
Intercept Intercept and trend
levels t = S&P500t − β0 − β1newst -3.097145** -5.436361***
t = S&P500t − β0 − β1Saddametert -3.838913*** -3.798512**
first differences t = S&P500t − β0 − β1newst -13.20518*** -13.14161***
t = S&P500t − β0 − β1Saddametert -9.259228*** -9.200276***
Table 3: Iraq War cointegration tests: ADF test statistics for unit roots in
residuals t.
in the newspaper.1
The estimated coefficients are presented in Table 4. Both news and the
Saddameter are highly significant at the 1%- and 5%-level, respectively, and
indeed indicate a negative relationship between stock prices and the war
likelihood. An increase in the probability of a war is thus associated with
decreasing stock market values.2 In particular, an increase in the difference of
the number of news, ∆newst, by one unit leads to a decrease in the difference
in the S&P 500, ∆SP500t−1, by 0.507 points. Similarly, an increase in the
difference of Saddameter value, ∆Saddt−1, by one percentage point leads to
a decrease in the difference in the S&P 500, ∆SP500t−1, by 1.112 points.
The one day lag in the news variable can be attributed to the time required
for physical publication in the newspaper. Since both probability measures
1Standard predictive models are often constructed such that changes in variables at
time t+1 are explained by changes in variables at time t. In our case this approach would
require to use a variable for the war likelihood which realizes prior to actual changes in
the stock market. However, since our argument is to use the news proxy as a flexible
probability measurement which is available for different wars over time, the functional
forms used here slightly differ from standard models due to the delay of news publication.
This however does not alter the models’ predictive power.
2Also, the error correction parameter γ is significantly negative as expected for both
types of probability measurements.
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Iraq War 2003 Iraq War 2003
ECM ECM
stocks on news stocks on Saddameter
∆SP500t−2 -0.053043 0.051166
0.110395 0.111035
γ -0.227357*** -0.394025***
0.068093 0.101989
newst−1 -3.661144***
0.564399
∆newst -0.507151***
0.183471
Saddt−1 -2.305066***
0.189155
∆Saddt−1 -1.114737**
0.492670
R2 0.168027 0.276713
N 78 78
from Nov 21, 2002 Nov 21, 2002
to March 18, 2003 March 18, 2003
Table 4: Iraq War: error correction model for the effect of the war likelihood
on stock markets.
yield the same implications, they may both be regarded as valid proxies which
ensures that we can employ the news variable as a valid proxy also in periods
of war where alternative probability measures are not available.
To study the behavior of the stock market at the onset of the war, we conduct
an analysis for structural breaks in the development of the stock market
index. To this end, the S&P 500 is regressed on a binary dummy Dt defined
as
Dt =
{
0 if t < t˜
1 if t ≥ t˜
where t˜ indicates a potential structural break, and a time window of size 513
around t˜ is used to obtain a set of regressions of the type
SP500t = β0 + β1Dt + t.
3That is, the data set ranges from t˜− 25 to t˜+ 25 days around t˜.
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Iraq War 2003
constant 832.1312*** 829.588***
3.2660 2.6123
Dt 47.74957*** 46.40008***
4.5742 3.6586
critical event March 20, 2003
R2 0.6898
date March 18, 2003
maximal R2 0.7665
N 51 51
Table 5: Iraq War: analysis for structural breaks in the S&P 500 stock market
index.
That is, t˜ is varied over time until the largest associated R2 is found, where
we suppose that the actual onset of a war, and hence the observed structural
break denoted by t0, lies in close proximity.
4
The results are presented in Table 5. The second column in this table shows
the regression with the largest possible R2 obtained in the set, which amounts
to 0.7665 in this case. The first column shows a regression where t0 is close
to that associated with the largest R2 and indicates a critical event in the de-
velopment of the conflict at the same time. Here, the largest R2 is associated
with March 18, 2002 while on March 20, 2003 the invasion of Iraq occured
(R2 = 0.6898). Thus, the above procedure predicts the true structural break
relatively well.5 In case of the Iraq war, the S&P 500 increases by 46.4 points
at the time of the predicted structural break and by 47.8 points at the time
of the invasion two days later. The coefficients are positive and significantly
different from zero at the 1%-level.
4We use this type of structural break analysis since we are interested in whether there
exists an instantaneous jump in the stock market index at the onset of a war. Alternatively,
one could ask whether there are possible changes in the trend of the stock market. Then,
for instance, a regression testing for changes in expected growth rates of stock returns may
be appropriate.
5Note that the estimated structural break on March 18 coincides with the beginning
of the US ultimatum to Saddam Hussein. Investors might have anticipated that this
ultimatum would not be agreed upon and hence caused an early rise in stock market
values.
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Costs in billion 2008 US$ % of GDP
World War II 4114 35.8
Korean War 320 4.2
Vietnam War 686 2.3
Gulf War 96 0.3
Iraq War 648 1.0
Afghanistan War 171 0.3
Table 6: List of the most costly wars to the US (Source: Stephen Daggett,
CRS Report for Congress, costs of major U.S. wars, July 2008).
4 The war puzzle – a general phenomenon
The results of the previous section could either be a general phenomenon
or just an idiosyncrazy of the Iraq War. In this section we therefore extend
the analysis to other wars with large international impact since the World
War II. We face two problems here: first, we need to decide which wars to
include, and second, the number of large scale wars during this time was –
fortunately – not big enough to use one econometric approach for all wars.
Instead of trying a unified analysis, we are therefore forced to study the
conflicts separately.
We solve the above-mentioned selection problem by using the list of the most
costly wars to the US (and thus arguably to the US economy) as composed
by Stephen Daggett6 (see Table 6). In the following we will study each of
the wars from this list, where we make a distinction between wars with a
surprising start and wars with a longer prelude. Since the wars took place at
very different times, with news traveling at different speeds, the econometric
models we apply necessarily differ in details.
4.1 World War II (1939–45)
To analyze World War II, two starting days can be studied: first, the German
invasion in Poland on September 1st, 1939, and second the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, involving the US into the war.
We study first the former event while we will study the latter in section 4.6.
To analyze it in an econometric setting, a first differences approach of the
form
6CRS Report for Congress, costs of major US wars, July 2008.
10
120.00
125.00
130.00
135.00
140.00
145.00
150.00
14.06.1939 28.06.1939 12.07.1939 26.07.1939 09.08.1939 23.08.1939
D
J I
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
n
e
w
s
DJI news
Figure 2: World War II: Dow Jones Index and probability of a war (June to
September 1939).
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World War II
first differences
stocks on news
constant 0.182669
0.185875
∆DJIt−2 -0.000372
0.118141
∆newst -0.284428***
0.086258
∆newst−1 -0.194573**
0.074057
∆newst+1 -0.265086***
0.069688
R2 0.227573
N 69
from May 25, 1939
to Aug 31, 1939
Table 7: World War II: first difference estimations of the effect of the war
likelihood on stock prices.
World War II
constant 138.332*** 137.9776***
0.7928 0.6311
Dt 12.60185*** 13.54894***
1.1104 0.8839
critical event September 1, 1939
R2 0.7244
date September 5, 1939
maximal R2 0.8274
N 51 51
Table 8: World War II: analysis for structural breaks in the Dow Jones Index.
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∆DJIt−1 = β0 + β1∆DJIt−2 + β2∆newst+1 + β3∆newst + β4∆newst−1 + t
is most appropriate. The stock market is described by absolute daily changes
in the Dow Jones Index, ∆DJI, and the war likelihood is from now on
captured by the news proxy, i.e. the number of articles in the New York
Times featuring the key words “war” and “Poland”. Figure 2 depicts the
relation between the Dow Jones Index and the probability of a war between
June and September 1939. Table 7 shows the regressions results obtained
from estimating this equation. The marginal effect of the news variable is
significantly negative for all different lags ∆newst−1, ∆newst, and ∆newst+1
and ranges from -0.195 (∆newst−1) to -0.284 (∆newst) points. Table 8 shows
the results obtained from the structural break analysis of type
DJIt = β0 + β1Dt + t.
September 5, 1939 is identified as the most likely structural break in the data
set (R2 = 0.8274). In fact, this lies close to the German attack of Poland
being the critical event on September 1, 1939 (R2 = 0.7244). The time lag
might be explained by the slower speed of news publication at that time.
4.2 Vietnam War (1955–75)
Next, we examined whether there is empirical evidence for the war puzzle in
case of the Vietnam War. This war distinguishes itself from others by the
fact that there is no clear time frame in which to fit the war, but it can rather
be described as an extended period of tensions. The development of the Dow
Jones Index and the news variable between February 1964 and March 1965
is depicted in Figure 3.
The most suitable regression for this war is a time-series approach of type
∆DJIt−1 = β0 + β1∆DJIt−2 + β2∆newst + β3∆newst−1 + t,
where the according results are presented in Table 9. Again, we see a sig-
nificant negative relation between the war likelihood and the development of
stock prices. Table 10 then shows the results for the analysis of structural
breaks in the Vietnam War. We see that the ad hoc regression identifies April
15, 1965 as the event associated with the largest coefficient of determination,
R2 = 0.7860. In fact, one critical event coincides with this date: it marks
the first US and South Vietnamese bombing of Viet Cong positions. The
jump in stock prices is significantly positive at the 1%-level and amounts to
an increase of the Dow Jones Index by 28.01 points.
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Figure 3: Vietnam War: Dow Jones Index and probability of a war (February
1964 to March 1965).
Note that for the war in Vietnam, the analysis does not exactly describe the
pre-war period and the distinct outbreak of the war itself, but nevertheless
proves to be a useful method to analyze the reaction of stock prices to war
news within a prolonged period of tensions.
4.3 Gulf War (1990-91)
We now analyze the Gulf War7 which started with the invasion of Iraq into
Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and ended with the defeat of the Iraq by the US
and their allies on February 28, 1991. However, the relevant date for our
analysis is January 17, 1990 when the Operation Desert Storm (with the
goal to liberate Kuwait) was started by massive aerial bombing and the war
started into its second and much larger phase. As such, our news series goes
until this date, interpreting the preceding time span as a pre-war phase from
the perspective of the US and their allies.
Analyzing this relation again by a time-series approach, Table 11 shows the
results. We see once more that there is empirical evidence for a significant
7The Gulf War is often also referred to as Second Gulf War or Persian Gulf War.
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Vietnam
first differences
stocks on news
constant 0.203179
0.160907
∆DJIt−2 0.151938***
0.055254
∆newst -0.045566
0.038402
∆newst−1 -0.116012***
0.038418
R2 0.050994
N 311
from May 6, 1964
to March 12, 1965
Table 9: Vietnam war: first difference estimations of the effect of the war
likelihood on stock prices.
Vietnam War
constant 896.2528*** 896.2528***
1.4909 1.4909
Dt 28.0122*** 28.0122***
2.0881 2.0881
critical event April 15, 1965
R2 0.7860
date April 15, 1965
maximal R2 0.7860
N 51 51
Table 10: Vietnam War: analysis for structural breaks in the Dow Jones
Index.
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Gulf War
first differences
stocks on news
constant 0.178762
0.373536
∆SP500t−2 0.158764
0.117019
∆newst -0.288532**
0.128104
∆newst−1 -0.220716
0.132420
R2 0.109827
N 72
from Oct 10, 1990
to Jan 1, 1991
Table 11: Gulf War: first difference estimations of stock returns and news.
negative relation between news and stock market values. The analysis for
structural breaks in the development of the S&P 500 (see Table 12) identifies
February 4, 1991 as the break point (R2 = 0.8457) which, however, lies some
days after the initial aerial bombing. In fact, the closest real event to this
indication is Battle of Khafji being the first major ground battle in the Gulf
War on January 29, 1991.
16
Gulf War
constant 325.0572*** 326.9776***
2.0514 1.8212
Dt 38.3470*** 41.80586***
2.8731 2.5506
critical event January 29, 1991
R2 0.7843
date February 4, 1991
maximal R2 0.8457
N 51 51
Table 12: Gulf War: analysis for structural breaks in the S&P 500 stock
market index.
4.4 Afghanistan (2001)
In contrast to the conflicts analyzed in the previous sections, the Afghanistan
war, starting in October 2001, had a too short prelude (beginning only after
Afghanistan’s involvement into the attack on September 11, 2001 became
clear) to be analyzed in a sufficient way. However, we can still perform an
analysis for structural breaks and show that there exists an increase in stock
market values at the onset of the war. Figure 4 depicts the development
of the S&P 500 and news between September and October 2001. Table 13
shows the empirical results from the analysis for structural breaks. Again
an increase in the S&P 500 around the time of the start of the war can be
detected.
4.5 Behavior of other large stock market indices
Do stock markets in other countries behave similarly as the US market? For
the two recent wars with sufficiently long prelude, i. e. the Gulf War and
the Iraq War, Figure 5 shows that Japanese, German, and European stock
indices mirror the development of the S&P 500 quite well. The analysis
for structural breaks (see Table 14) shows particularly for the Gulf War
simultaneous up-moves at the onsets of war.8
8Although it would be interesting to see how stock markets evolved in the countries
were war actually took place, this analysis is often not feasible. Either stock exchanges
were not yet institutionalized, or controlled by the government so that data would not be
reliable, or data is not available.
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Figure 4: Afghanistan War: S&P 500 and probability of a war (September
to October 2001).
Afghanistan War
constant 1037.976*** 1034.467***
5.83 5.24
Dt 44.01092*** 51.41128***
8.16 7.33
critical event Oct 7, 2001
R2 0.3724
date Oct 12, 2001
local maximal R2 0.5008
N 51 51
Table 13: Afghanistan War: analysis for structural breaks in the S&P 500
stock market index.
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Figure 5: Comovement of other stock market indices for the Gulf War (left)
and the Iraq War (right).
Note: For the sake of comparability, the data series of Nikkei, DAX, and
Eurostoxx are linearly transformed such that all series have a mean equal to
the mean of the S&P 500.
critical event estimated breaks
S&P 500, DJI Nikkei DAX Eurostoxx
Iraq War Mar 20, 2003 Mar 18, 2003 Mar 7, 2003 Apr 7, 2003 Feb 25, 2003
Gulf War Jan 29, 1991 Feb 4, 1991 Feb 5, 1991 Jan 30, 1991 N/A
Table 14: Analyses for structural breaks in other large stock market indices.
4.6 Wars “out of the blue”
So far we have analyzed wars that had a more or less pronounced prelude.
However, there are also some wars with a very fast and unexpected onset.9
Most notably, these are:
• the start of the involvement of the United States into World War II
(Pearl Harbor) on December 7, 1941,
• the Korean War, that started with the rather unexpected invasion of
North Korea into South Korea on May 25, 1950,
• and finally the Gulf War, or more precisely, the invasion of Iraq into
Kuwait on August 2, 1990.
In all of these cases we cannot expect to find the pattern that we have ob-
served before the outbreak of the wars analyzed in the previous section. There
9Li & Sacko (2002) find that an unexpected onset of a military dispute reduces bilateral
trades more severely.
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is simply no pre-war phase that could be analyzed and where an increase in
the probability of war could decrease stock market prices.10
What we can observe, however, is whether the onset of a war led to a sudden
increase or decrease of the stock market prices. A structural break analysis,
very similar to the analysis conducted above, shows that this is indeed the
case for all three wars. – However, the pattern is inverted: In all three cases
the stock market prices went significantly down at the outbreak of the war.
In the case of Pearl Harbor the Dow Jones index went down nearly 3% on
one day, in the case of the Korean War nearly 5% and in the case of the Gulf
War it went down around 5,7% within a week.
4.7 What’s puzzling about the war puzzle
Our analysis so far has revealed quite a peculiar pattern. On the one hand,
stock prices tend to fall when the probability of a war increases and tend to
rise when there are signs for a peaceful resolution. However, in the same war
the eventual onset of the war will increase stock market prices.
While this by itself is already puzzling it becomes even more puzzling consid-
ering the evidence that we have found about surprising wars (wars without a
lengthy prelude). Here we observe that stock market prices tend to decrease
once the war breaks out. In other words, whether stock prices decrease or
increase when a war breaks out does not seem to depend much on the par-
ticular war but more on the previous history or, more precisely, whether the
war was surprising or not. But even this observation cannot explain the dis-
crepancy that one and the same war first suggests a pattern that an increase
in the likelihood of a war decreases stock market prices but then ultimately
the onset of the war itself increases them. This cannot easily be accommo-
dated with the idea that stock market prices reflect expectations of the future
economic development of a country.
5 Attempts to explain the puzzle
5.1 War as a stimulus package for the US economy
The first idea about this puzzle might be that it is none: a war can be
considered as a stimulus package for the US economy and thus lead to an
increase in stock market prices.
However, this line of argument does not work for two reasons: First, we have
seen in section 4.5 that the puzzle also seems to be present for countries
10Unless we studied intra-day data which in most of these cases is not available.
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which were not involved in the respective war, as, for instance, Germany in
the Iraq War. Second, the explanation fails to explain why before the war,
prices fall whenever the war becomes more likely.
Falling prices when war is looming and rising prices when war is starting: only
the combination of these two observations makes the war puzzle a puzzle.
5.2 Expectations about a quick end of the war
A natural idea is to consider the time dimension (Schneider & Troeger 2006):
once the war breaks out, it is clear that the trouble will be over soon, thus
investors buy stocks again. For example, the Saddam Security can be in-
terpreted as the likelihood of a coming war, but also as expected length
of the war after the war took place (Amihud & Wohl 2004, Wolfers &
Zitzewitz 2009). Chappell & Eldridge (2000) have also suggested psycho-
logical explanations such as “despair” and “renewed hope”, regarding the
UK stock index reactions to the two sub-periods during World War II. There
are, however, at least two arguments that lead us to discard this natural
looking idea to explain our findings as well:
• Since the Saddam Security works well as a proxy for the estimated
probability for a war, it is clear that investors did not expect the war
to take place in a far future: recall, that the particular security that
we studied would only pay out if Saddam Hussein was out of power by
June – not long after the war indeed took place!
• While the positive expectation about a quick war that ends the costly
and lengthy tensions before, might be true, e.g., for the war on Iraq
(although in hindsight it turned out to be overly optimistic), this cannot
explain the pattern observed at the onset of World War II, given that
it was generally not expected that this war would end quickly, given
the experience of the four year long World War I.
• The expectation about a quick end of the war cannot explain why
investors do not seem to appreciate the increase of the likelihood for a
coming war earlier, as this brings the war (and hence its end) closer.
5.3 Ambiguity averse investors
An alternative explanation that seems to be natural is to assume that in-
vestors show ambiguity aversion. At first the ambiguity about the probabil-
ity, that a war starts, makes people to shy away from the stock market and
hence leads to lower stock prices. This effect stops as soon as it becomes clear
21
that a war is indeed starting for sure and uncertainty is reduced (Schneider
& Troeger 2006). Guidolin & Ferrara (2005) suggest that the initiation of
conflict can been seen as a sign of resolve and investors tend to show positive
reactions by buying stocks
However, this seemingly natural behavioral explanation cannot accommodate
our empirical data, as ambiguity cannot make an ambiguous situation seem
worse than its worst possible outcome! In this situation that would mean
that even though the probability for the start of a war is uncertain and hence
ambiguous, an ambiguity-averse investor would still prefer this situation over
a situation where the war has started for sure.
5.4 Uncertainty about investment decisions
Another idea to resolve the puzzle is to consider the uncertainty about a war
as an uncertainty about the decision between different portfolio allocations:
in case of a peaceful resolution an investor should have invested into different
assets than in the case of a war. While it is uncertain which of the two
outcomes will occur, it might be optimal for an investor to stay out of the
stock market entirely, or at least to reduce its holdings substantially.
To study this idea more in details, we describe a small model that captures
these ideas:
When facing a possibility for the outbreak of a war, an investor has to decide
between investing into two different portfolios, a “war portfolio” that will be
successful if a war breaks out, and a “peace portfolio” that will be successful
if the conflict ends in a peaceful resolution. We summarize the four potential
outcomes in the following table11:
War breaks out Peaceful resolution
(probability p) (probability 1− p)
war portfolio a -b
peace portfolio -c 1
Assuming that it is in any case bad for the investor to speculate on the wrong
outcome, we have a, b, c ≥ 0.
The expected payoff of the investor now depends on his portfolio decision.
If he decides for the war portfolio, it is ap − b(1 − p). If he decides instead
for the peace portfolio, it is (1 − p) − cp (compare Fig. 6). Obviously, the
war portfolio is better for large values of p and worse for small values. The
11For simplicity we normalized the investor’s return in the case of a peaceful resolution
for a “peace portfolio” to one.
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cut-off point is at
p∗ =
1 + b
1 + a+ b+ c
,
as a small computation shows.
Expected
payoff
p
1
-b
a
-c
p*
peace portfolio
war
 por
tfoli
o
Decreasing prices Increasing prices
Figure 6: Investors switching from a “peace portfolio” to a “war portfolio”
when the probability of a war increases beyond a threshold p∗ could explain
the war puzzle.
This model indeed predicts the observed pattern: an increase in p makes at
first the peace portfolio less and less attractive. Consequently, investors will
sell the corresponding stocks. At the same time, however, the war portfolio
is still even less attractive, thus the falling prices of the peace portfolio stocks
can not be matched by rising prices of stocks in the war portfolio. Once the
probability of a war reaches p∗, the pattern changes: now, war stocks become
more and more attractive, thus investors buy them and the overall market
starts to rise.
In order to find a probability p∗ that is close to one and thus in line with our
empirical evidence, b needs to be sufficiently large, thus the potential loss
when choosing a war portfolio, but encountering a peaceful resolution should
be fairly big.
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Theoretically, we can explain the puzzle in this way, but how is it in reality?
How can we test empirically whether this model indeed explains the war
puzzle? The general idea is that different stocks should show a different
pattern during the different phases before an outbreak of the war: stocks
that are in the “peace portfolio”, i.e. stocks that would profit from a peaceful
resolution of the conflict, should initially be sold whenever the likelihood of
a war increases. Thus we would expect that they follow the general observed
pattern of the stock market, but only before the outbreak of the war: at that
point these stocks should not increase significantly, as there is no reasons for
investors to purchase them once it is clear that the “war portfolio” is the
right investment.
Stocks from the “war portfolio” instead should follow the increase of the
stock market at the start of the war, but not its previous decrease whenever
the war became more likely.
A simple empirical test is now possible by looking at sectorial differences
between sectors that should clearly be in the war portfolio (weapon-related
industry) and sectors that should clearly be in the peace portfolio (e.g., travel
related industry). It turns out, however, that as convincing as the theoretical
idea is, as thoroughly it fails this simple, but clear-cut test: in fact, whereas
sectors that one would undoubtedly assign to the peace portfolio (e.g., travel
stocks, like airlines) increased most at the outbreak of the war, while stocks
in the war portfolio (weapon manufacturers) did not.
To sum up, the obvious explanation that looks good in theory, does unfor-
tunately not help to resolve the puzzle in reality.
5.5 Mean-variance preferences
Finally there is a very unexpected possible explanation for the phenomenon:
classical mean-variance-preferences. Indeed, this concept could surprisingly
well explain the observed data. One could argue that people do not buy
when it is unsure what is going to happen due to their variance aversion,
even though the expected return might still be a little bit better than when
the war finally started. In this sense the observed phenomenon could be
related to the mean-variance-paradox.
To formalize this idea, we assign average expected returns µW and µP to the
two potential outcomes (war and peace). We denote the probability of a war
by p, then we can compute the variance of the two-outcome lottery (µW with
probability p and µP with probability 1− p) as var(p) = (1− p)2(µP −µW )2.
If p = 0 (i.e. peace is sure) or p = 1 (i.e. war is sure) the variance accordingly
becomes zero and it is maximal for p = 1/2 (see Fig. 7).
Typical indifference curves for a mean-variance investor with utility µ−ασ2
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μP
Expected
payoff
σ²
μW
p=0
p=½
p=1
p=p*
Figure 7: Mean-variance preferences can explain the war puzzle. Here µP and
µW are the returns in case of peace and war, respectively. σ is the variance
of the situation, depending on the probability for a war. It is maximal when
the probability is one half (maximal degree of uncertainty). The dashed lines
are indifference curves, i.e. they mark combinations of mean and variance on
which an investor would be indifferent. A certain war is preferred over an
uncertain situation with a high probability of a war (points on thick line).
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are also shown in Fig. 7. Looking at the indifference curve through the point
(0, µW ) (i.e. a certain war) we see that this investor would prefer a certain
war (p = 1) over a situation where p is large, but still smaller than one.
When the probability p increases slowly from zero to one, at first the situation
worsens for the investor (who consequently would value stocks less), but after
a certain point (in our model at p∗ = (α − 1)/α, as a short computation
shows) there is indeed a perceived improvement for the investor, explaining
the increase in stock prices at the outbreak of a war.
6 Conclusions
We have observed that stock market prices react very sensitively to the prob-
ability for the outbreak of a major war. The pattern that has been confirmed
with several wars during the last century shows that an increase in the like-
lihood of a war decreases stock prices and vice versa. Puzzling, however, is
that once a war breaks out, stock market prices do not decrease further, but
on the very opposite, increase significantly. This was true for all wars with
a more or less lengthy prologue. Wars that occur “out of the blue” show a
different pattern in that they tend to decrease stock market prices. These
results are certainly a challenge for classical asset pricing models.
We showed that mean-variance preferences of investors might be able to
explain the observed pattern. There could be, however, different explanations
for this puzzle based on other behavioral factors. Only future research, e.g.
with the help of laboratory experiments, might be able to resolve the puzzle
completely.
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